JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. electorate over the last half century. We contend that a major key to that movement is a rare, massive, and enduring shift of the electoral equilibrium commonly known as a partisan realignment. The research, which is based on time-series data that employ the classic measurement of party identification, shows that the 1980 election triggered a systematic growth of Republican identification that cut deeply into the overwhelming Democratic lead dating back to the New Deal realignment. Although short-term fluctuations in macropartisanship are responsive to the elements of everyday politics, neither presidential approval nor consumer sentiment is found responsible for the 1980 shift. Realignments aside, macropartisanship is guided by a stable, not a continuously moving, equilibrium.
Realignment and Macropartisanship
December 2001 change often, and a shift is akin to a cosmic upheaval, called a critical or realigning election (Burnham 1970; Campbell et al. 1960; Key 1955 ). Sellers (1965) postulates an "equilibrium cycle" in American politics: Realignments that lead to the ascendancy of one party are followed by a return to a more equal balance until the arrival of the next realignment. The elections of 1860, 1896, and 1932, according to most observers, can be designated as realigning.
The causes and consequences of realignment have received much scholarly attention (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980; Sundquist 1973) . A realignment requires "the presence of a great national crisis, leading to a conflict regarding governmental policies and the association of the two major parties with relatively clearly contrasting programs for its solution" (Campbell 1966, 76). During these periods politics becomes unusually ideological, and electoral defeats of the majority party are not simply deviations brought on by temporary lapses in judgment or by the personal appeal of a candidate. Instead, the vote begins to reflect a major reorientation of long-term party attachments. Some argue that the reorientation occurs through conversion of partisanship in the electorate (Erikson and Tedin 1981; Sundquist 1973) , and others emphasize generational change or mobilization (Anderson 1979; Beck 1974; Campbell et al. 1960; Norpoth 1987 ). Moreover, the shift alters the composition of party coalitions in the electorate, giving some groups a stronger voice and weakening that of others (Petrocik 1981; Stanley and Niemi 1995) .
We contend that the 1980 presidential election, in and of itself, exhibited the symptoms of a realignment in five respects. First, for the first time since 1932, an elected president was defeated. Although the majority party had previously lost control of the White House in "deviating elections," Jimmy Carter was repudiated in a landslide. He garnered even fewer votes in the Electoral College than did Hoover in 1932, whose ouster ushered in the New Deal realignment (Burnham 1981; Pomper 1981) .
Second, the national economy was in severe distress, suffering from a seemingly incurable combination of high inflation and high unemployment (stagflation). This adversity, along with humiliation in foreign policy, cost Carter the election (Markus 1982 ). More important, a dismal performance of the economy undermined the Democratic Party's New Deal reputation as the party of prosperity (Pomper 1981, 91) .
Third, the winner in 1980 promised a radical departure from traditional Democratic ideology and a resolution of the national condition diagnosed as "malaise" by the losing incumbent. Ideological zeal set Reagan apart from the other victorious Republicans before him. As the "most conservative president since ... (Burnham 1981 , 99), Reagan would be able to count on a conservative tilt in the American public (Markus 1982, 551) .
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Fourth, Reagan was an intensely partisan Republican, determined to make the GOP the majority party. He was the "only president of the post-war era who took office as an avowed partisan and unvarnished ideologue" (Miller and Shanks 1996, 168) .
Fifth, the turmoil and discontent of the previous fifteen years softened the electoral terrain for a partisan realignment in 1980. Attachments to either major party had diminished through a process dubbed "dealignment" (Converse 1976 
CHANGE OF MACROPARTISANSHIP
As is common in the study of macropartisanship, the variable of interest is the percentage of Democrats among those with a major party identification (Democrats and Republicans, regardless of the strength of the identification). Independents, including those who profess to lean toward either party, are excluded. Macropartisanship simply registers the relative weight of Democratic vis-a-vis Republican identification. For example, a figure of 62 indicates that among 100 respondents expressing a partisan identification, there are 62 Democrats and 38 Republicans. The focus on partisans at the expense of independents is quite congenial for the examination of a possible realignment, since we are concerned with shifts of the partisan balance. Figure 1 conclude that, in the nearly 50 years of NES polling, the only marked and lasting shift in macropartisanship occurred in the wake of the Reagan elections. All the others either made no dent or only appear to do so because of their proximity to the Reagan elections. These findings are based on an analysis that includes midterm as well as presidential elections. Some of the midterm readings for macropartisanship in Figure 1 The model is dynamic because it presumes that at some point the system moves from a fairly stationary steadystate period to a fairly dramatic change; the change is manifested by a "critical moment" in the time series. Significantly, however, the change-the dynamic growthdoes not end with the critical moment. Instead, it continues over an extended period, albeit at a much slower place.
In other words, a critical shock gradually moves a system from one steady state to another. The effect is enduring for the foreseeable future, but it is not accomplished in a single step. Two parameters govern this process: w captures the initial shock, and 8 summarizes the aftershocks. Think of w as initiating either a climb or a descent to a new equilibrium. Either way, the initial effect may be positive (a gain) or negative (a loss), but the rate at which it continues to build invariably has a positive sign. In the long run, the total accumulation of change predicted by the gradualpermanent model will add up to the ratio w/(1-6). It is by such an amount that the aftermath equilibrium will differ from the one prevailing before the realignment. Technically, the period of change is infinite, but in practical terms most of the change will register within a foreseeable time frame.
The requirement that change is supposed to occur over some longer period sets the gradual-permanent model apart from the theory of critical elections, which posits a relatively sudden conversion (Burnham 1970; Key 1955 ). Furthermore, the gradual model is not the same as a secular realignment framework, which views change as proceeding incrementally (Converse 1966; Key 1959 ), on southern convergence). The gradualpermanent model captures the story of a rapidly unfolding change during a "realigning electoral era" (Campbell 1966, 75) . Even if the change turns out to be abrupt, the model still proves useful. The aftershock parameter will drop to zero, and all the weight will rest on the initial shock. The difference between a gradual and an abrupt model is in the delta parameter. We can let the parameter estimate settle this issue, but we need guidance as to the onset of change. How certain is it that the equilibrium shift commenced with the 1980 election? Why not with the policy success of Reagan's first year in office? Or with the recovery following the 1981-82 recession? Or with the "It's morning in America, again" reelection campaign of 1984?
To settle these questions, we need a more frequent sounding of partisanship than the biennial NES but one that nonetheless relies on the same instrument. The NES party identification question, with its "generally" and "usually" qualifiers, aims to determine not just any partisan but especially the "long-term identifier who is momentarily piqued at his own party, or tempted to defect temporarily to vote for a charismatic candidate of another party" (Converse 1976, 35 Table 2 . That was an estimate of the difference in average macropartisanship before and after the election, without considering a dynamic parameter. Table 3 indicates, also move macropartisanship in a highly significant fashion. Consumer confidence, however, does not appear to have a direct effect. When jointly considered with presidential approval, this economic measure loses out as a predictor of macropartisanship. Still, given the fairly strong correlation (.45) between those two predictors, the economy has an indirect effect on macropartisanship, mediated by presidential approval. Economic assessments, not surprisingly, drive presidential approval ratings and through that vehicle manage to affect partisanship. Such an indirect influence could be parceled out of the overall effect attributed to approval, but in the end that does not give us any better purchase on macropartisanship than does presidential approval alone. Therefore, the consumer confidence measure was dropped from subsequent specifications.
THE DYNAMICS OF MACROPARTISANSHIP
To expand the event horizon of the key short-term variable, we added a dynamic factor for presidential approval ratings. According to the results presented in the second column of Table 3 , the dynamic rate for approval proves strong and significant. In other words, the president's party benefits from high ratings of his job performance, and the effect cumulates at an impressive rate. The question, however, is what that does to the realignment specification. The answer is that the 1980 realignment model continues to perform powerfully even in the presence of the economic and political fundamentals. Given the estimate for the initial effect (-1.03) and a dynamic rate of 91%, the cumulative effect reaches 11.4 percentage points. That is the long-term change in macropartisanship triggered by the Reagan victory in 1980. This shift in the electoral equilibrium occurred independently of the on-going fall-out from presidential performance as recorded in job approval ratings.
Before we accept the conclusion that the 1980 election triggered a realignment, let us consider the alternative of a second shock in 1984, associated with Reagan's fourth year in office, that culminated in his reelection. The results in the third column of Table 3 fail to support the two-shock model. The initial effect for 1984 appears quite strong and has the right sign (-1.8), but it falls woefully short of significance, as does the dynamic rate. At the same time, the specification for the 1980 election survives unscathed. What took the wind out of the apparent effect for 1984?
We believe the 1980 election set in motion a shift in the partisan equilibrium that was well under way by 1984. Figure 2 maps the predicted trajectory of the shift, based on the parameter estimates for the 1980 election in Table 3 (second column). According to that trajectory, most of the realignment effect was concentrated in Reagan's first term. The pace of change slows markedly in his second term and flattens out afterward.4 What obscures this long-term shift in the observed series of macropartisanship, however, are shortterm setbacks for the Reagan administration, especially the 1981-82 recession, which dropped the president's approval ratings to a record low in 1982. We do not deny that presidential approval moves macropartisanship, but that is short-term change around a baseline. As Reagan's ratings tumbled in his first term, so did his party's standing, which led to an above-equilibrium rise (given the Democratic direction) in the macropartisanship index. When Reagan's popularity rebounded along with the economy in late 1983 and throughout 1984, macropartisanship inched back toward the equilibrium, even overshooting the mark.
By no means a trivial factor for partisanship, presidential approval ratings nevertheless do not possess the leverage, even considering their cumulative effect, to generate realignment-size shifts in macropartisanship. Given the parameter estimates for model 2 in Table 3 (an initial effect of .06 and a dynamic rate of .61), a one-point change in presidential approval produces a cumulative shift of just 0.15% in macropartisanship. To engineer the realignment of the 1980s-a long-term shift of 11 points in macropartisanship-would require a boost of nearly 70 points in approval ratings above the average level, which is a statistical impossibility. In other words, the realignment of the 1980s was not the work of exceptional prosperity of a hugely popular president, at least not in the way those conditions, according to our estimates, normally affect partisanship.
But realignment periods are not ordinary times. They are moments of qualitative not just quantitative change. The upheaval surrounding an electoral realignment may very well be associated with mutations in the way factors such as presidential popularity and the economy affect partisanship. Structural change in model parameters cannot be ruled out (Maddala and Kim 1998, chaps. 13 and 15). In view of the realignment that unfolded during Reagan's tenure, one could suppose that his approval rating had a structurally different grip on partisanship than was true under his predecessors and successors. The same could be said for economic sentiment, but the failure of this variable to prove significance in the presence of approval precludes its further use.
A model that allows parameters to vary for the Reagan years, during which most of the realigning shift accumulated, leads to the estimates shown in the fourth column of Erikson, and Stimson 1989) . The thrust of their argument is that there is no unique equilibrium to which partisanship will necessarily return after some departure due to external forces. Instead, the equilibrium is whatever is produced by the accumulation of political and economic conditions. In a sense, politics and economics constantly move macropartisanship to a new equilibrium.
In contrast, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (1998) see great merit in the notion of a constant equilibrium. They make a compelling argument by asking hypothetically whether the fluctuations in macropartisanship would stay within such narrow boundaries without the gravitational pull of a stable force, which they believe is very doubtful. Indeed, the bounded nature of the macropartisanship movement is hard to reconcile with the notion of an ever-changing equilibrium. We agree that the familiar political and economic variables lack sufficient leverage to shift equilibrium, even with cumulative effects taken into account.
To be sure, it is not easy to identify a constant level for macropartisanship over a half century even though its movement appears to be bounded. This suggests an intermediate type of equilibrium where shocks do not dissipate quickly, yet they do not remain at full strength forever (Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996, 1998). Such a dynamic fits uneasily into a zone between autoregressive adjustment and random drift. If macropartisanship possesses equilibrium, then it must be one that can tolerate prolonged departures or is of the moving variety.
We take the position that macropartisanship exhibits a realignment-induced equilibrium. At any point there may be movement, but the level of macropartisanship is fairly stable until disrupted by conditions powerful enough to warrant the label "realignment." Then the baseline changes, and for a long time. The adjustment is gradual, which should not be confused with a moving equilibrium. The point of distinction is that in our model an equilibrium shift is rare, not a daily possibility depending on the flow of everyday politics. If the 1980 realignment is seen as a "structural break" (Maddala and Kim 1998), we can demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that macropartisanship behaves as a stationary process. Every version of the structural-break test, by a wide margin, supports that conclusion." At the same time, these test results cast doubt on the latest technology employed by Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (1998) in defense of their macropartisanship theory. The presence of a structural break, if not taken into account, will lead to erroneous evidence for a cointegrating relationship (Maddala and Kim 1998). Ultimately, it is a backhanded confirmation of the 1980 realignment that it makes such a powerful difference: Ignore this intervention, and macropartisanship is a bundle of contradictions; take it into account, and we have a well-behaved specimen of equilibrium. Coming to grips with a realignment effect solves a major puzzle regarding the nature of aggregate partisanship.
CONCLUSION
Much of the movement in aggregate party identification (macropartisanship) in the American electorate during the last half century can be traced to a major realignment. Our analysis, based on both the NES and the New York Times/CBS News surveys, demonstrates a substantial and lasting shift of the partisan balance. The 1980 election sparked a growth in Republican identification that shrank the overwhelming Democratic lead dating from the New Deal realignment. Although the GOP did not achieve outright majority status, the new balance meant that the two major parties would compete on nearly equal terms in national politics, which paved the way for the Republican victory in the 1994 congressional elections. The success of the Democrats in the presidential contests of 1992 and 1996 failed to reverse the Republican gains in partisanship, let alone restore the pre-1980 Democratic lead.
The 1980 realignment fits the pattern of a dynamic model with a gradual-permanent set of parameters. A critical moment interrupts the partisan equilibrium and sets in motion an evolutionary change that eventually settles at a new steady state. This is no overnight phenomenon. The process triggered by the 1980 election took most of Reagan's first term before yielding noticeable gains in Republican partisanship. However much this suggests that the realignment was performance driven, our analysis shows otherwise. The key factors-presidential approval ratings and consumer sentiment-may generate wiggles around the partisan baseline, but they are not capable of triggering an avalanche. Reagan's popularity did not generate the 1980s realignment. If popularity were the key to such shifts, the opportunities were far better under Eisenhower and even Nixon (before his disgrace). What is more, given the relationship between approval ratings and partisanship, it would require impossible, not just improbable, surges in popularity to account for partisan realignments.
The key to the 1980 realignment lies in the ideological reorientation of national policy during the Reagan years. Swept into office by an economic crisis of uncommon severity, Reagan pursued a version of conservatism (Reaganomics) that departed sharply from New Deal liberalism. His party was able to exploit an ideological division in the electorate, in which conservatives outnumbered liberals. As in previous realignments, the agenda of the federal government underwent a change that to a large extent endured under control by the opposition party. It would be foolish, of course, to claim that the 1980 shift would have taken hold even if the economy had not recovered, just as the New Deal realignment might have been doomed had the Depression continued. Exactly how the Reagan agenda may have helped bring about the 1980 realignment is a question for future research. 5 We examined three versions of a modified unit-root test with the New York Times/CBS News macropartisanship series, assuming a structural break in 1980. Version A (crash), which allows for a one-time change of intercept, produces a test statistic of -5.26 (with a critical value of -3.77). Version B (changing growth), which allows for a change of slope, produces a test statistic of -5.81 (with a critical value of -3.80). Version C (both intercept and slope changes) has a test statistic of -5.23 (with a critical value of -3.99). Thus, the unit-root hypothesis is firmly rejected in all three instances. In comparison, the standard unit-root test without the specification of a structural break is a close call: a Dickey-Fuller test statistic of -2.79, with a critical value of -2.89.
